



The Indian Journal for Research in Law and Management

Open Access Law Journal – Copyright © 2026

Editor-in-Chief – Dr. Muktai Deb Chavan; Publisher – Alden Vas; ISSN: 2583-9896

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 4.0 International (CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0) License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, JUDICIAL EVOLUTION, AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

By Khushi Thakur

ABSTRACT

India's human rights system is built upon a carved Constitution that ensures enforceable fundamental rights, a judiciary motivated to interpret these rights broadly, and a collection of statutory bodies established to oversee adherence. Over time, the Supreme Court has expanded Article 21 from a limited protection against arbitrary government actions to include rights to privacy, a clean environment, and protection from climate change. However, India's actual practices often differ from these constitutional promises. Custodial violence is still common, old speech restrictions from colonial times persist in practice, and the main human rights body in India faces international criticism for lacking independence. This article explores the constitutional and judicial framework for human rights protection in India, looks at the systems set up to enforce it, places Indian practices in the context of international treaty obligations, and identifies the main differences between official guarantees and real-life experiences. It ends with suggestions for reforms to bridge this gap.

KEYWORDS: Constitution of India, fundamental rights, judicial review, National Human Rights Commission, civil liberties, Article 21

I. INTRODUCTION

In Indian public law, human rights hold a distinctive position compared to other post-colonial constitutions. Rather than being merely aspirational, they are enforceable guarantees that can be directly challenged against the state under Article 32 of the Constitution and through the

High Courts under Article 226. This decision, taken by the Constituent Assembly during the era of Partition and colonial rule, has influenced seventy-five years of India's constitutional development. Fundamental rights have supplied the vocabulary through which Indians have contested preventive detention, environmental degradation, workplace harassment, prison conditions, and, more recently, the effects of climate change.

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993

The historical roots of this design lie in the freedom movement itself. Colonial-era statutes—the sedition provision inserted into the Penal Code in 1870, the preventive detention powers used against nationalist leaders, the restrictions on assembly and the press—supplied the Constituent Assembly with a working list of the powers it wished to constrain. The Assembly's Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights, chaired by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and the broader debates that followed drew explicitly on the experience of detention without trial under colonial rule, on the Government of India Act, 1935, and on contemporary international instruments then being negotiated at the United Nations. The result was a Part III considerably more detailed, and more obviously shaped by recent constitutional grievance, than the rights chapters of many contemporaneous constitutions.

The remainder of this article proceeds in eight parts. Part II sets out the constitutional architecture of rights protection. Part III hints at the judiciary's role in expanding that architecture through interpretation. Part IV examines the institutional mechanisms India has built to enforce rights outside ordinary litigation. Part V lays domestic law within India's international obligations. Part VI turns to the principal areas where practice falls short of the constitutional promise. Part VII offers a critical analysis of why that gap persists, Part VIII sets out recommendations, and Part IX concludes.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Articles 12 to 35

Article 19 provides six distinct freedoms: speech and expression, assembly, association, movement, residence, and profession. Each of these freedoms can be limited by reasonable restrictions outlined in the article itself, such as those concerning sovereignty and integrity,

public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence¹. The term "reasonable" has become the central focus of Article 19 litigation, as it requires courts to evaluate not only if a restriction fits within the specified categories but also if it is proportionate to the interest it aims to protect. This evaluation grants the judiciary significant interpretive freedom, resulting in a substantial and occasionally inconsistent body of case law.

Article 32 is itself among the rights it protects. Dr B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the Constitution's Drafting Committee, described it as the heart and soul of the Constitution, since it allows any person to approach the Supreme Court directly to enforce a fundamental right, bypassing the ordinary hierarchy of appeals. The same remedy, in modified form, is available before the twenty-five High Courts under Article 226, whose writ jurisdiction extends beyond fundamental rights to any legal right.

B. DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

Articles 36 to 51

Directive Principles of State Policy, laid out in Articles 36 to 51 of Part IV of the Indian Constitution, guide the state in building a just society. Borrowed from the Irish Constitution, these principles are not enforceable in court, unlike Fundamental Rights, but they shape the laws and policies a government is expected to frame.

They call on the state to secure adequate livelihood, equal pay for equal work, protection of workers and children, and a fair distribution of resources. Article 39 sets out these economic goals. Article 44 pushes toward a uniform civil code, Article 45 speaks to early childhood care and education, and Article 48 addresses agriculture and animal husbandry. Article 51 asks India to promote international peace and respect for treaty obligations².

Though non-justiciable, courts have used these principles alongside Fundamental Rights to interpret laws, and several, like the right to education, have eventually found their way into enforceable rights. Together, Articles 36 to 51 reflect the constitutional vision of a welfare state working toward social and economic democracy.

¹ Constitution of India, 1950.

² Constitution of India, 1950.

C. FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES

The Forty-Second Amendment of 1976 added Part IVA, which mentions eleven fundamental duties of citizens under Article 51A³, including the duty to protect the environment, develop scientific temper, and safeguard public property. These duties are not enforceable against citizens in the way fundamental rights are enforceable against the state, and their practical effect on human rights litigation has been marginal. They are, however, invoked with some regularity by courts explaining why an individual right must yield to a collective interest.

III. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE

The text of Part III has changed little since 1950. What has changed, dramatically, is its judicial interpretation. Four moments in that interpretive history illustrate how the Supreme Court converted a narrow, positivist reading of fundamental rights into an expansive charter of dignity.

A. FROM A.K. GOPALAN TO MANEKA GANDHI: THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

*A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras*⁴

*Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*⁵

This single decision reoriented Indian rights jurisprudence. It supplied the interpretive method—reading Article 21 broadly, and testing state action against a standard of substantive fairness—that the Court would later use to derive rights not listed anywhere in the constitutional text: the right to a speedy trial, the right to legal aid, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter, and the right to a clean environment among them.

B. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

*Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India*⁶

*Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India*⁷

³ Constitution of India, 1950.

⁴ *A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras*, AIR 1950 SC 27.

⁵ *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*, AIR 1978 SC 597, (1978) 1 SCC 248, [1978] 2 SCR 621.

⁶ *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 1, AIR 2017 SC 4161.

⁷ *Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India*, AIR 2018 SC 4321, (2018) 10 SCALE 386.

C. GENDER IDENTITY AND WORKPLACE RIGHTS

*National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India; Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026*⁸

*Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan*⁹

D. ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE RIGHTS

*M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India*¹⁰

E. SPEEDY TRIAL, LEGAL AID, AND THE UNDERTRIAL POPULATION

*Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar*¹¹

F. CUSTODIAL SAFEGUARDS

*D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal*¹²

G. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO FOOD

*People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India*¹³.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTION

A. THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

*Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993*¹⁴

The National Human Rights Commission was set up in 1993 under the Protection of Human Rights Act, as an independent body to look into cases of human rights violations across the

⁸ National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.

⁹ Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011, (1997) 6 SCC 241.

¹⁰ M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 570 (2024 INSC 280).

¹¹ Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369, 1979 SCR (3) 532.

¹² D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610, (1997) 1 SCC 416, 1997 SCC (Cri) 92.

¹³ People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (Supreme Court of India).

¹⁴ Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.

country. It can investigate complaints on its own or after receiving a petition, visit jails and detention centres, and recommend action against erring officials, though its orders aren't binding on the government.

Headed by a chairperson who has served as Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge, along with several members, the Commission also reviews laws that touch on human rights and works to spread awareness through education and training. It stands as a watchdog meant to keep state power accountable to basic human dignity.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

Beyond the NHRC, the principal enforcement mechanism for human rights in India remains constitutional litigation itself, particularly the relaxed standing rules developed under public interest litigation (PIL) from the late 1970s onward. PIL allowed any public-spirited individual, and not only a directly aggrieved party, to petition the Supreme Court or a High Court on behalf of those unable to approach the court themselves—undertrial prisoners, bonded labourers, and pavement dwellers among them.

*Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India*¹⁵

PIL has been credited with dramatically widening access to constitutional remedies for people who could never have afforded conventional litigation, and criticised, with comparable force, for drawing courts into budgetary and policy questions better suited to elected legislatures and for occasionally producing sweeping directions that are difficult for the executive to implement without further guidance from the same Court.

C. SPECIALISED NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

Alongside the NHRC, Parliament has created a set of specialised statutory commissions addressing particular constituencies: the National Commission for Women, the National Commission for Scheduled Castes, the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, the National Commission for Minorities, and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. Each functions as a quasi-judicial body with powers to investigate specific grievances,

¹⁵ *Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India*, AIR 1984 SC 802, (1984) 3 SCC 161.

though, as with the NHRC, their recommendations generally lack binding force and depend on executive follow-through for practical effect.

D. THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT

A fourth mechanism operates indirectly on rights enforcement by making the state's own conduct visible. The Right to Information Act, 2005 gives every citizen an enforceable right to request information from public authorities, subject to specified exemptions, and backs that right with an appellate structure culminating in state and central information commissions with the power to impose penalties on officials who withhold information without justification. The Act has been used extensively by human rights defenders, journalists, and public interest litigants to obtain the records-inquiry reports, compliance data, expenditure details-on which litigation and advocacy under Part III often depend, making it a quiet but substantial part of the architecture of rights enforcement even though it does not itself create substantive rights.

V. INDIA'S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The CEDAW reservations are a useful illustration of a broader pattern: India tends to accept international human rights obligations readily at the level of civil and political rights enforceable through its own courts, while entering reservations or declining recommendations precisely where an obligation would require displacing a domestically sensitive body of personal law or security legislation. The pattern is neither unique to India nor evidence of bad faith, but it does mean that ratification of an instrument supplies, at most, a starting point for domestic argument rather than a guarantee of domestic effect.

India follows a dualist approach to international law: treaty ratification does not, by itself, alter domestic law, which requires separate implementing legislation or, short of that, judicial incorporation through interpretation. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 explicitly folds international covenants into the domestic definition of human rights, but the practical effect of that provision depends on courts choosing to read domestic statutes consistently with treaty text-something they have done with some consistency in cases involving gender equality and child rights, and with less consistency in cases touching on national security.

India has also not ratified the UN Convention Against Torture, signed in 1997 but never brought into force domestically through ratification, despite recommendations from successive Law Commission reports that Parliament enact a standalone anti-torture statute. The absence of such a law leaves custodial torture prosecutable, where at all, through the ordinary provisions of criminal law rather than through an offence specifically calibrated to the power imbalance between a detainee and the state.

India also participates in the Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council, under which every member state's human rights record is examined by its peers at roughly four-year intervals and which generates a formal set of recommendations that the state may accept or merely note. India has generally accepted recommendations relating to gender equality, disability rights, and child protection, while declining or merely noting recommendations touching on the repeal of AFSPA, ratification of the Convention Against Torture, and reform of laws affecting religious minorities—a pattern that mirrors, at the international level, the same domestic reluctance to subject the security establishment to the same degree of external scrutiny applied elsewhere.

VI. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

A. CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF SEDITION

*Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023*¹⁶

Alongside the new criminal code, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as amended in 2019 to permit the designation of individuals as terrorists, continues to be used against journalists, students, and civil society activists in cases that rights organisations argue involve ordinary dissent rather than unlawful activity. Prolonged pre-trial detention under the Act's stringent bail provisions functions, in practice, as punishment independent of eventual conviction, since trials frequently take years to conclude.

B. THE ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT AND CONFLICT ZONES

*Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958*¹⁷

¹⁶ Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

¹⁷ Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 gives the military special powers in regions declared "disturbed," largely parts of the Northeast and Jammu & Kashmir over the years. Officers can arrest without a warrant, search homes, and open fire when needed to keep order, with backing from the state or central government.

Critics have long pointed to custodial deaths and disappearances linked to the Act, with prosecutions rare since sanction from the central government is required first. Irom Sharmila's decade-long hunger strike in Manipur turned the demand for repeal into a national conversation. Supporters say it's needed to fight insurgency in sensitive border areas; opponents call it a colonial hangover that clashes with basic civil rights.

C. MINORITY RIGHTS AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

Reports from domestic and international monitors covering 2025 and early 2026 document continuing communal tension in several states, including allegations of expulsion of Bengali-speaking Muslims characterised as undocumented migrants, incidents of vigilante violence linked to cow protection, and anti-conversion laws in several states that critics argue are used disproportionately against religious minorities and inter-faith couples. The government has consistently rejected characterisations of a broader democratic decline, framing these as isolated law-and-order matters rather than a pattern.

Ethnic conflict in Manipur, which began in 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities and has continued intermittently since, illustrates a related dimension of the same problem: the state's capacity to protect life and property under Article 21 breaks down most visibly not in ordinary criminal matters but in situations of communal or ethnic breakdown, where policing itself can become identified with one side of the conflict. Displacement, destruction of places of worship, and prolonged internet shutdowns imposed as a law-and-order measure have all featured in accounts of the conflict, raising distinct questions about the compatibility of prolonged, blanket internet suspensions with the freedom of speech and the right to carry on trade and profession guaranteed under Article 19.

E. CASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION

Constitutional and statutory protections against caste discrimination-Article 17's abolition of untouchability, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013-coexist with continuing evidence of manual scavenging deaths in sewers and septic tanks, disproportionately affecting Dalit workers, and with persistently low conviction rates under the Atrocities Act, attributable in substantial part to witness intimidation and delayed investigation¹⁸.

F. WOMEN'S SAFETY AND THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

The gang rape and death of a young woman in Delhi in December 2012 produced the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, which widened the definition of rape, created new offences for acid attacks, stalking, and voyeurism, and established fast-track courts for sexual offence cases. More than a decade later, conviction rates in rape cases remain low relative to the number of cases registered, trial delays routinely stretch beyond the statutory ninety-day target for completion, and forensic backlogs in state laboratories continue to slow investigations. The gap here mirrors the gap identified elsewhere in this article: legislative reform following a moment of public outrage, followed by an implementation shortfall that outlasts the public attention that produced the reform.

G. DIGITAL RIGHTS AND SURVEILLANCE

The expansion of privacy jurisprudence after Puttaswamy has run alongside an expansion of the state's own surveillance capacity. Reporting since 2021 has documented the alleged use of Pegasus spyware against journalists, opposition politicians, and civil society figures, prompting a Supreme Court-appointed technical committee to examine the allegations; the committee's findings on the extent of deployment were not made fully public, leaving the underlying accountability question substantially unresolved. Parliament has since enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which establishes data-processing obligations for private and public entities alike, but the Act's broad exemptions for government agencies acting in the interest of state security have drawn criticism from privacy advocates who argue that the exemptions risk hollowing out the very right the legislation is meant to operationalise.

¹⁸ Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.

H. PRISON OVERCROWDING

The undertrial population that concerned the Court in Hussainara Khatoon has not shrunk with time. National Crime Records Bureau data compiled in successive Prison Statistics India reports have shown occupancy in Indian jails running well above rated capacity in most states, with undertrial prisoners-those awaiting or undergoing trial rather than serving a confirmed sentence-consistently making up more than two-thirds of the total prison population. Overcrowding of this scale compounds nearly every other custodial concern addressed in this Part: it strains the medical and sanitation infrastructure of prisons, increases the risk of violence between inmates, and makes the individualised monitoring that D.K. Basu's guidelines assume considerably harder to sustain in practice.

I. DISABILITY RIGHTS

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 expanded the categories of recognised disability from seven to twenty-one and imposed obligations on the state to ensure accessibility in public buildings, transport, and information systems, giving statutory effect to India's ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Implementation has been uneven: accessibility audits conducted by disability rights organisations continue to find widespread non-compliance with the Act's building and transport standards in both older and newly constructed public infrastructure, and employment quotas for persons with disabilities in government service remain substantially unfilled in most states¹⁹.

VII. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE GAP BETWEEN GUARANTEE AND PRACTICE

Two structural features of the Indian system help explain the recurring gap between constitutional guarantee and lived experience. First, enforcement in India runs overwhelmingly through litigation rather than through independent, binding administrative oversight. The NHRC and its state counterparts can investigate and recommend, but cannot compel compliance; the burden of enforcement falls back on courts already carrying substantial docket backlogs, and on individual litigants who may lack the resources to sustain years of proceedings. A right that depends on a willing and well-resourced litigant is, for most people most of the time, a right in name only.

¹⁹ Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Second, several of the areas of greatest concern-custodial violence, AFSPA-related impunity, and the practical operation of anti-terror law-involve the coercive apparatus of the state directly, an area in which courts have historically shown greater deference than they display in adjudicating, say, environmental or gender-equality claims. The doctrinal tools the judiciary has used so effectively to expand rights in Part III have been applied far more cautiously where the respondent is the police or the armed forces rather than a passport authority or a private employer.

The NHRC's own accreditation difficulties illustrate a third problem: institutional design that looks robust on paper can be hollowed out through appointment practices, unfilled vacancies, and a composition that draws too heavily on the same executive apparatus the institution is meant to check. A human rights commission substantially staffed by former police officials investigating complaints against the police faces an inherent, structural credibility problem regardless of the good faith of any individual member.

A fourth, related pattern recurs across the specific issues surveyed in Part VI: legislative reform tends to follow a moment of acute public attention-a single custodial death that draws national coverage, a single assault that produces sustained protest, a single court judgment that cannot be ignored-rather than proceeding from a sustained programme of institutional strengthening. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 followed one case; the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 followed treaty ratification rather than domestic mobilisation and has consequently drawn less sustained implementation pressure; the transgender rights legislation of 2026 followed a twelve-year gap after the judgment it was meant to implement. Reform driven by episodic outrage produces statutes; it does not reliably produce the ordinary administrative capacity-trained personnel, monitoring data, budget allocations-needed to make those statutes operate as intended once public attention has moved elsewhere.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A durable narrowing of the gap between constitutional text and administrative practice would require action on several fronts. Parliament could enact a standalone law criminalising custodial torture, consistent with India's 1997 signature to the UN Convention Against Torture, rather than relying on general provisions of the penal code that were not drafted with the specific power imbalance of custody in mind. The sanction requirement under the Armed

Forces (Special Powers) Act could be narrowed or subjected to a time limit, so that it no longer functions as an indefinite bar to prosecution.

The NHRC's composition could be reformed to meet the Paris Principles' pluralism requirements in substance rather than form, with fixed timelines for filling vacant commissioner posts and a statutory floor on civil society and gender representation in its senior leadership. Its recommendations could be given a stronger, though not necessarily binding, procedural status—for instance, a requirement that the concerned government respond in writing within a fixed period, with reasons for any refusal to act, to be laid before the relevant legislature.

Finally, the reformulated provisions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita addressing offences against the state would benefit from an explicit statutory defence for speech amounting to no more than criticism of government policy, restoring in the text of the law a protection that previously existed only through accumulated judicial interpretation of the repealed Section 124A.

Beyond these specific measures, the recurring pattern identified in Part VII—reform driven by episodic public attention rather than sustained institutional investment—suggests a more general prescription: statutory reforms adopted in the aftermath of a single galvanising case should carry built-in review mechanisms, such as a legislative requirement that the relevant ministry report to Parliament on implementation data at fixed intervals, so that accountability for a law's practical operation does not depend on the accident of continued public attention to the case that produced it.

IX. CONCLUSION

India's constitutional commitment to human rights is neither hollow nor merely aspirational. Seven decades of judicial interpretation have given Article 21 a reach far beyond its four corners, extending constitutional protection to speedy trial and legal aid, education, food security, privacy, gender identity, workplace dignity, and now the effects of climate change. That interpretive achievement, however, sits alongside a persistent institutional shortfall: an apex human rights body facing international questions about its own independence, custodial death and prison overcrowding figures that have changed little in scale over successive years, and a criminal law framework that continues, in substance, to constrain political speech in ways its drafters describe as a departure from colonial practice rather than a continuation of it.

Closing that gap is less a matter of further judicial innovation, which has arguably reached the outer limits of what interpretation alone can achieve, than of institutional reform-appointments, funding, monitoring data, and statutory design-carried out by a legislature and executive willing to treat the NHRC's own findings, and the Supreme Court's own accumulated jurisprudence, as a mandate for sustained administrative action rather than as a matter to be managed only when public attention makes inaction untenable. The constitutional text and the case law surveyed in this article already supply most of the normative architecture required; what remains outstanding is the ordinary, unglamorous work of implementation.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: India (4 February 2026).

Amnesty International, 'India: GANHRI Members should sustain pressure for reforms at the Indian Human Rights Commission' (26 March 2026).

The Wire, "India's National Human Rights Commission Faces 'Historic' Downgrade as UN-Linked Body Flags Govt Interference" (28 April 2025).

National Human Rights Commission, India, Report: Human Rights Day 2025 (January 2026).

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 (1948).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.

