Abstract
Since Independence, India’s economic trajectory has been marked by a constant tension between
regulatory state and market economy. Observing from the early years of planned development in
India to the liberalization reforms of 1990s and the contemporary emphasis on market-led growth,
it is seen that Indian economic governance has continuously witnesses the boundaries of state
intervention and private enterprise. This negotiation is not merely just economic in sense, but also
deeply rooted in constitutional, legal, and managerial in nature.
Here lies a core fundamental question that is “How should the Indian state regulate markets in
manner that promotes growth without sacrificing the normative value of social justice, economic
equity, and democratic accountability ?” This question has now acquired a matter of renewed
urgency amid rising rate of inequality, regulatory dilution, and increasing reliance on private
capital for public goods.
This article argues that while market economy is essential for efficiency and innovation, it’s also
the fact that it cannot function as a self-justifying principle in a constitutional democracy. Instead
of this, a robust state regulation must operate as a coercive mechanism to ensure that markets serve
broader social objectives rather than just narrower interest. India’s governance framework,
however is rooted in constitutional commitments to social and economic justice. It also provides
both the normative justification and institutional tools for such regulation.