Abstract
Digital platforms increasingly perform adjudicatory functions by determining the legality and visibility of online speech through content moderation systems, algorithmic enforcement, and internal appeals mechanisms. This article conceptualizes these governance structures as "platform courts" and argues that they represent a significant privatization of justice operating largely outside constitutional safeguards, procedural fairness, and democratic accountability. Drawing upon constitutional theory, comparative regulatory frameworks, and scholarship on private governance, the paper analyses how platforms such as Meta, YouTube, and X exercise quasi-judicial authority over billions of users. It critically evaluates the institutional limitations of Meta's Oversight Board, the United States' state action doctrine, the European Union's Digital Services Act, and India's Information Technology Rules, 2021, demonstrating that existing approaches either permit unaccountable private governance or risk excessive state control over online speech. The article contends that neither contractual consent nor platform self-regulation adequately legitimizes decisions with profound consequences for freedom of expression and democratic participation. It proposes a co-regulatory framework grounded in structural due process, algorithmic transparency, independent appellate mechanisms, and external institutional oversight while preserving editorial autonomy. The paper concludes that the challenge posed by platform governance cannot be resolved through traditional constitutional doctrines alone; instead, private governance must be constitutionalized through procedural safeguards that reconcile technological innovation with accountability, fairness, and the rule of law.