Abstract
Constitutional conventions occupy a distinct position within the Indian constitutional structure. These unwritten norms have historically ensured the functioning of the parliamentary democracy in the country. Recent controversies concerning the prolonged vacancy of the Deputy Speaker, the exercise of the Speaker's procedural powers, Money Bill certification, gubernatorial discretion, coalition politics and judicial appointments indicate that constitutional conventions are no longer merely supplementary constitutional practices but have become central to debates concerning democratic accountability and institutional legitimacy. While existing scholarship on constitutional conventions tends to focus upon the theoretical or institutional aspects of the system, the conventions have transformed in their role within the country's constitutional structure.
This paper argues that the principal constitutional challenge facing India is not the disappearance of constitutional conventions but instead the transformation of those silences in the Constitution into opportunities for constitutional strategy. It contends that while constitutional actors increasingly comply with the formal text of the Constitution, the weakening of convention-based restraints has diminished the capacity of unwritten constitutional norms to regulate institutional conduct effectively. It demonstrates that constitutional conventions can be preserved without codifying them into the Constitution. Finally, it suggests a structure for preserving those conventions and allowing for the flexibility that is necessary to a functioning constitutional democracy in India.
This study explores a crucial constitutional issue: do constitutional conventions still serve as meaningful checks on institutional power in modern India? Or have the gaps in the Constitution turned into opportunities for strategic manoeuvring that undermines democratic accountability, all while staying within the bounds of the Constitution.
Keywords: Constitutional Conventions; Constitutional Morality; Unwritten norms; Constitutional Silences; Parliamentary democracy; Westminster Model.