INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INDIA: GAPS, INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND REFORM DIRECTIONS

Institutional arbitration is widely regarded as the preferred mode of resolving complex commercial disputes, yet arbitration in India remains dominated by ad hoc proceedings that depend heavily on the courts. This article examines why, despite successive reforms to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, institutional arbitration remains underutilised in domestic practice. It analyses three dimensions: the statutory and institutional framework, including the Arbitration Council of India, which the 2019 amendments created on paper, but which has not been constituted; the legal, institutional and cultural factors that sustain ad hoc arbitration; and comparative lessons from leading seats and institutions on emergency arbitration, court–institution interaction, and quality control in appointments and case management. The article shows that Indian courts have moved towards the international mainstream on territoriality, public policy and emergency relief, notably in Amazon v Future Retail, but that the judicial–institutional interface remains underdeveloped. Drawing on the 2017 Srikrishna Committee report, it identifies five persistent gaps: operational, capacity and governance, awareness and trust, court-centred appointments under section 11, and sectoral policies that continue to favour ad hoc clauses. It also considers the 2024 draft amendment Bill and a Ministry of Finance memorandum on public procurement, which together reveal ambivalence in state policy. The article argues that institutionalisation is not a panacea and calls for a calibrated strategy: constituting and operationalising the Council, consistent judicial reliance on capable institutions, stronger governance within domestic institutions, and leadership by state entities in adopting institutional arbitration clauses, to realise India's aim of becoming an arbitration hub.