Abstract
India’s rapidly expanding digital economy has transformed the way consumers access goods and services, while simultaneously creating new challenges for competition law. Digital markets are characterised by multi-sided platforms, network effects, data-driven business models, and non-price forms of competitive harm such as self-preferencing and algorithmic discrimination. These features raise questions about whether the Competition Act, 2002, which predates the modern digital economy, remains adequate to address the conduct of large technology platforms. This article examines the application of the existing competition law framework to digital markets, with particular focus on the Competition Commission of India’s approach to search engines, mobile ecosystems, app stores, and data-related practices. It further analyses the limitations of conventional ex post enforcement, particularly the difficulty of addressing anticompetitive conduct after market power has become entrenched. The article examines the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, including the introduction of the deal value threshold and settlement and commitment mechanisms, alongside the emerging debate surrounding ex ante regulation and the proposed Digital Competition Act. It argues that while the existing framework provides considerable flexibility to address several forms of digital anticompetitive conduct, the speed and structural characteristics of digital markets may require stronger preventive mechanisms. The article concludes that India should continue refining its competition framework to ensure that regulation keeps pace with technological developments while preserving innovation and fair competition.
Keywords: Competition Law, Digital Economy, Big Tech, Digital Markets, Competition Commission of India, Ex Ante Regulation, Competition Act, 2002, Self-Preferencing, Network Effects