IS CURATIVE PETITION DIFFERENT FROM A SECOND REVIEW PETITION?

The introduction of the curative petition in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) created a rare and extraordinary remedy within India’s constitutional framework. Unlike review petitions, which are explicitly recognized under Article 137 of the Constitution, curative petitions derive their legitimacy from a judicial reading of Articles 137 and 142, designed to prevent a miscarriage of justice even after dismissal of a review. While both procedures seek to correct judicial errors, their scope, grounds, and admissibility diverge significantly. Review petitions allow a broader range of grounds, whereas curative petitions are confined strictly to violations of natural justice and must satisfy stringent procedural requirements, including scrutiny by the senior-most judges and certification by senior counsel. This study argues that curative petitions, though often perceived as a “second review,” in practice embody a narrower and more restrictive avenue. Their evolution reflects both judicial creativity and the Court’s ambivalence in balancing finality with fairness.