NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND COMPETITION LAW: BRIDGING INDIA'S REGULATORY GAP IN LIGHT OF GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS

Labour market collusion has become an active enforcement concern in several major jurisdictions since 2021. The European Commission fined Delivery Hero and Glovo €329 million for a no-poach cartel, the UK's Competition and Markets Authority issued detailed guidance on the subject, the US secured its first criminal wage fixing conviction and Canada criminalised the conduct outright. India has taken no comparable step, notwithstanding credible reports that two of its largest conglomerates entered an arrangement of exactly this kind. This paper argues that the Competition Act, 2002 already supplies the tools needed to address such conduct. Section 3(3) reaches no-poach and wage fixing agreements once "supply" is read to include labour alongside goods, a reading consistent with how the European Commission itself characterises comparable conduct. The CJEU's restriction by object doctrine offers a workable framework the Commission could adopt without legislative amendment. Drawing on comparative enforcement and India's own judicial treatment of labour restraints, the paper sets out three specific reforms available to the Commission.