Abstract
Plea bargaining has emerged in India as a procedural mechanism intended to address the persistent problems of delay, overcrowded prisons and excessive criminal case pendency. Introduced through Chapter XXI-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and continued under Chapter XXIII of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the framework permits an accused to seek a mutually satisfactory disposition in exchange for a reduced sentence, subject to judicial supervision and statutory safeguards. This paper examines whether plea bargaining genuinely promotes timely justice or risks compromising the rights of the accused, victims and society. It evaluates the statutory framework, constitutional dimensions and judicial approach, particularly in relation to voluntariness, legal representation, speedy trial, self-incrimination and fair procedure. The paper also considers comparative experiences from the United States, England and Wales, and Germany to identify safeguards relevant to the Indian context. Although plea bargaining offers potential benefits such as reduced judicial burden, quicker resolution, compensation and limited sentencing outcomes, its actual use in India remains extremely low. The paper argues that delay alone cannot justify increasing plea bargaining without addressing the conditions influencing an accused’s decision. Stronger legal assistance, custody review, transparent prosecutorial discretion and systematic record-keeping are necessary to ensure that efficiency does not come at the cost of justice.