TELECOM SECURITY THROUGH SANCHAR SAATHI: IS VOLUNTARINESS ENOUGH?

Governments today increasingly govern not by issuing orders, but by building digital systems that shape how people communicate. Sanchar Saathi, a platform created by the Government of India to prevent telecom fraud and help users recover lost phones, is one such system. By allowing phones to be blocked across networks using their International Mobile Equipment Identity (“IMEI”), the platform directly affects access to communication, even though it is presented as a voluntary and user-driven service. This article asks a simple question: when the State controls access to communication through digital infrastructure, are consent and basic transparency enough? This article argues that they are not. While the Government has listed the permissions required by the app and emphasised that users choose whether to use it, these measures only explain how people enter the system. They do not explain what happens after. These key questions remain unanswered. How long is user data kept? Who can access it? How are mistakes reviewed? And what limits prevent temporary restrictions from continuing indefinitely? Using Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, the article examines Sanchar Saathi through the Supreme Court’s approach to communication rights, particularly the requirement that restrictions must be limited in time, proportionate, and open to review, as laid down in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India. It also considers how exemptions under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 reduce the role of consent and make stronger safeguards necessary. The article concludes that in public digital systems, consent cannot replace law. Technology may enable governance, but only clear legal limits and accountability can make it constitutional. Keywords: Public Digital Infrastructure; Sanchar Saathi; IMEI Blocking; Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023; Consent; Telecom Regulation; Constitutional Rights; Digital Governance