THE ADJUDICATION TRAP: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE FAILURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947

The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was enacted during a period of state paternalism to establish a baseline of security for the Indian working class and maintain industrial harmony. However, as the Indian economy shifted from a socialist, state-controlled framework to a highly competitive, globalized marketplace, the structural mechanisms of the Act began to create unintended consequences. This paper critically examines "the adjudication trap" the process by which the Act shifts industrial conflict away from voluntary bipartite negotiations and into state-mandated, compulsory litigation. By analyzing key statutory provisions including references under Section 10, the definition of an "industry" under Section 2(j), individual rights under Section 2A, and the stringent security measures of Chapter V-B this paper explores how expansive judicial re-interpretations and profound institutional delays have hindered the growth of mature collective bargaining in India. Furthermore, the paper highlights a paradox: the rigid job security provisions intended to protect permanent employees have instead accelerated the casualization of labour, driving industries to rely heavily on unprotected contract workers. Ultimately, this study evaluates the ongoing transition to the unified Industrial Relations Code, arguing that modern industrial stability requires an agile, collaborative framework that balances corporate operational efficiency with the financial security and fundamental dignity of the workforce.