The Anti-Defection Law in India: A Critical Analysis of its Constitutional Purpose and Effects on Representative Democracy

The Anti-Defection Law was incorporated in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India in the year 1985 through the 52nd Amendment. The main objective was to prevent the defection of members of the legislature from the political party on which they won the election to another political party, and to ensure the stability of governments. At the same time, it led to tensions within the notion of representative democracy as it limited the freedom of elected representatives to vote, dissent, or act according to their conscience or in the interest of their constituency. This paper critically examines the constitutional purpose of the Anti- Defection Law and evaluates its impact on representative democracy in India. It analyses the grounds of disqualification under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, the merger exception under Paragraph 4, and the adjudicatory authority vested in the Speaker or Chairman under Paragraph 6. The paper further examines a few judicial interpretations with respect to the Tenth Schedule and one recent Judgement passed by the Telangana High Court in respect of disqualification of an MLA. This Paper argues that although the Anti-Defection Law has curbed unprincipled defections and horse-trading, it has strengthened centralised party control at the cost of reducing legislative deliberation and individual autonomy.