THE DE FACTO UNION VETO: ANALYSING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT’S APRIL 2025 VERDICT AND THE NOVEMBER 2025 ADVISORY OPINION ON GUBERNATORIAL ASSENT

The Constitution of India currently has 448 articles as of 2025, organised into 25 parts and 12 schedules. Article 200 of the Constitution views the governor as an enabler of the legislative process rather than a veto power. However, the recent trend of Gubernatorial inaction in states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Punjab has caused a federal crisis that has contributed to a federal impasse that has significantly impeded legislative functioning. This paper critically analyses the jurisprudential shift in the approach to this issue throughout 2025. Specifically, in the light of the landmark judgment of the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (April 2025), which addressed the Governor's inaction in the legislative process by withholding bills and delaying assent. The Supreme Court emphasised that Governors are constitutionally expected to act ‘as soon as possible’, while deliberately refraining from prescribing rigid or numerical timelines, against the subsequent Presidential Reference Advisory Opinion (November 2025), which appears to soften these timelines in the favour of gubernatorial discretion. This paper argues that the ambiguity introduced by the Advisory opinion raises the possibility of a “De Facto Union Veto,” which would enable the Centre(via the Governor) to prevent State legislation indefinitely. By examining the Constituent Assembly Debates and the Sarkaria Commission recommendations, the paper concludes that a strict judicial timeline is the only remedy to maintain the balance and prevent the office of the governor from becoming a parallel centre of power.